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UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA: SKEPTICAL
SCRUTINY AND THE FUTURE OF GENDER
DISCRIMINATION LAW
The legal war between the sexes dates back to the origin of
our country and its common law legal system which promoted
the idea of treating men and women differently.' Over the last
twenty-five years, United States Supreme Court decisions have
continually challenged the traditional notion that women, based
solely on their gender, were not entitled to the same rights and
liberties as men.2 Through the extension of equal protection
guarantees,3 the nation's highest court has struck down many of
the legal bases for gender discrimination.4 This jurisprudential
'Under the common law, women were not treated equally. See JOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §14.20, at 772 (5th ed. 1995) (tracing
historical treatment of women and gender-based discrimination in United States);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 19
(1989) ("The United States inherited a common-law tradition in which women were
more separate than equal."). Originally, the Supreme Court interpreted the Four-
teenth Amendmentfs Equal Protection Clause as applying to only racial classifica-
tions. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, §14.20, at 772. Therefore, legislatures contin-
ued to pass laws discriminating on the basis of gender, particularly in the areas of
labor law and jury duty. Id.; see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)
(sustaining law prohibiting women from obtaining bartender's license unless she
was wife or daughter of male owner); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139
(1872) (upholding law which denied women right to practice law).
2 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (addressing traditional view that
men were more qualified to administer estates than women). Through Reed and its
progeny, the Supreme Court began to break down notions that men were more ca-
pable than women to perform tasks and roles outside the home.
3 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court extends equal protection to
members of both sexes by subjecting any gender based classifications to equal pro-
tection scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (striking down state
provision setting legal drinking age at 18 for women but 21 for men); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding that
United States military cannot discriminate between male and female service mem-
bers by allowing wives, but not husbands, to automatically be considered depend-
ents).
The Supreme Court first applied the equal protection analysis to gender dis-
crimination in Reed. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (applying Equal Protection Clause to case
involving Idaho statute which provided that as between two persons equally quali-
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shift5 continually forces the courts and legislatures to closely ex-
amine the equal protection ramifications of policies in order to
ensure that laws, by policy or practice, do not discriminate on
the basis of gender.6
fled to administer estates, men received preference over women); see also NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, §14.20, at 773. The Reed decision sparked a five year period
in which the Court struggled with the appropriate standard to be applied in situa-
tions of sex discrimination. Id. This period ended with the Court's decision in Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and the adoption of an intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard. Id.
" The women's rights movement and its push for legal reform pressured courts
to begin applying the equal protection analysis to gender discrimination cases. The
slow movement of the court with regard to sex discrimination resulted in the pro-
posal of the Equal Rights Amendment. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA
FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CON-
STITUTION 62-63 (1986). See generally RHODE, supra note 1, at 53-62 (discussing de-
velopment of women's rights movement of 1960s). Rhode explained the different
ideologies comprising the women's rights movement. One faction promoted a unified
movement of both men and women to achieve gender equality while another be-
lieved that only through the alienation of men could women succeed. Id. at 59-60.
Additionally, the author described the interests of different races of women. Id. at
60 (emphasis supplied). Race often divided women when determining a strategy to
advance their movement. Id.
6 Initially, the Court considered gender discrimination cases under the rational
relationship test of the Equal Protection Clause. If the law involved was rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest, it was valid. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76
("The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex ...
bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced ....");
HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION 29 (4th ed. 1996) (observing that courts applied rational relation-
ship test in gender discrimination cases through 1971). This rational relationship
test is the basic standard applied in most equal protection cases. Id. (noting that
rational relationship test served as easier of two tests applied in equal protection
cases); see also RHODE, supra note 1, at 86-87. In Reed, the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that there was a "rational basis" in a sex based preference because it
minimized expense and controversy in estate administration. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
Eventually, the Supreme Court created a new test to be applied in cases of gen-
der discrimination-the intermediate scrutiny test. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197
(holding that classifications based on gender must "serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives" in
order to withstand constitutional challenge); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (holding that intermediate scrutiny test applies,
regardless of which gender is target of discriminatory policy).
The intermediate scrutiny test applies not only in cases of gender discrimina-
tion, but also when the legitimacy of children or alienage are at issue. See Clark v.
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating intermediate scrutiny standard has, in fact,
been used in illegitimacy issues); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982)
(holding that laws denying public education to those not legally admitted into this
country fail intermediate scrutiny test and violate Equal Protection Clause); Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (using intermediate scrutiny
standard in holding that government cannot discriminate against illegitimate chil-
dren to punish parent's illicit relations).
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Founded in 1839, the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") was
the only single-sex public college in Virginia and the last state-
funded, all-male military institution in the country.7 The insti-
tution's original objective was to turn young men into citizen-
soldiers.8 VMI's admissions policy reflected the all-male status
of the armed forces at the time of the school's inception.9 Despite
the integration of women into the armed forces and other public
colleges in Virginia, the Board of Visitors, VMI's equivalent of a
Board of Trustees, continued to retain an all-male Corp of Ca-
dets.'0 The desire of the Board of Visitors to retain its all-male
It should be noted that classifications based on race or national origin are sub-
ject to a tougher strict scrutiny test which requires the classifications to be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest in order to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985) (reciting requirements of strict scrutiny test); NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 1, §14.3, at 602 (explaining that courts apply strict scrutiny test when
examining discrimination based on race or national origin).
7 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996); see also Julie M Am-
stein, United States v. Virginia: The Case of Coeducation at Virginia Military Insti-
tute, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 69, 72 (1994) (examining VMrIs all-male admissions
policy, equal protection guarantees, and history of 'separate-but-equal' concept in
order to analyze constitutional claims against Commonwealth of Virginia).
8 United States v. Virginia (VMI I), 976 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992), affd, 116
S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The case decisions involving the initial question of equal protec-
tion violations, as opposed to remedies for the violations, are often referred to col-
lectively as VII I, while case decisions addressing the remedy issues are collectively
referred to as VMI II. See Jon A. Soderberg, The "Constitutional" Assault on the
Virginia Military Institute, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 429, 430 (1996) (referring to
VMI litigation as VMI I and I); Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in the
Citadel and VMI Litigation, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1996) (analyzing differences
in strategies used by U.S. government in VMI cases and private parties in Faulkner
v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), affd, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995)).
9 Id.; see Transcript of Oral Arguments at *4, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available in 1996 WL 16020 ("While re-
stricting VMI to men might have been inevitable, indeed required at the time VMI
was initially established because the military at that time was all male, as VMI's
mission has broadened that's [sic] obviously no longer true.") Id.
0 Women began serving in the military when Congress passed the Women's
Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. Women's Armed Services Integration Act,
Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948); see also CPT. CAROL BARKALOw, IN THE
MEN'S HOUSE 313-26 (1990) (tracing chronology of women's incremental acceptance
and participation in military from 1901-1990); Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services, FACT SHEET, March 1990, at 2 (on file with author) (reciting
history of women in armed services prior to creation of Defense Advisory Committee
on Women in Services in 1951). After President Gerald Ford signed The Department
of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat.
537, the federal service academies-the United States Military Academy, the
United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Academy-became
coeducational training grounds for military officers. See 10 U.S.C. §4343 (1994)
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admissions policy led to a head-on clash between the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and a
state's power to fund single-sex colleges. The battle ended with
the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Virginia11 that the
Board of Visitors' all-male admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause 2 and that the proposed remedy-the Virginia
Women's Leadership Institute ('VWIL") at Mary Baldwin Col-
lege, did not remedy the constitutional violation. 3 On Septem-
ber 21, 1996, the Board of Visitors of VMI voted to admit women
cadets into the class of 2001, upending 157 years of an all-male
admissions policy.14
Responding to a complaint filed by a female high school stu-
dent interested in attending VMI, the United States brought suit
against the Commonwealth of Virginia, VMI, the school's presi-
dent, its superintendent, and the Board of Visitors, seeking to
force the end of VMI's all-male admissions policy."i The Supreme
(requiring Secretary of Defense to take necessary and appropriate action to ensure
gender neutral admission to service academies); see also MAJ. GEN. JEANNE HOLM,
USAF (RET.), WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 305 (1982)
(discussing gender integration of federal service academies); BARKALOW, supra, at 2-
5 (explaining political atmosphere surrounding gender integration of West Point
prior to Barkalow's attendance in 1976).
Sex discrimination in higher education is not new to the Commonwealth of
Virginia. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2277 (1996) (-[N]o struggle
for the admission of women to a state university ... was longer drawn out, or devel-
oped more bitterness, than that at the University of Virginia.'") (citations omitted).
After almost a century of battle, the prestigious University of Virginia only opened
its doors to women in 1972. See id. at 2278; Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 186 (E.D. Va. 1970) (reviewing final settlement of dis-
pute concerning coeducation at University of Virginia).
" 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 2269 ("Valuable as VWIL may prove for students who seek the program
offered, Virginia's remedy affords no cure at all for the opportunities and advan-
tages withheld from women who want a VMI education and can make the grade.").
"A remedial decree must closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to
place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in the position
they would have occupied in the absence of [discrimination]." Id. at 2282 (brackets
in original).
14 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the U.S. District Court to ensure
compliance with the Court's decision. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287.
By a 9 to 8 vote, VMI's governing body voted to admit women. Lorrie Grant, Vir-
ginia Military Institute Votes to Admit Women, ROcKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 22, 1996,
at 64A.
" Initially, the suit named Governor Lawrence Douglas Wilder, the Common-
wealth of Virginia, Virginia Military Institute, its president, superintendent, and
members of the Board of Visitors, Virginia's State Council of Higher Education, and
its members as defendants. United States v. Virginia (VMI I), 766 F. Supp. 1407,
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Court decided two critical issues: whether VMI's admission pol-
icy violated the Equal Protection Clause, and whether the crea-
tion of the VWIL remedied the alleged violation.'6 In a 7-1 deci-
sion,17 the Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision holding that VMrs
admissions policy violated equal protection guarantees, 8 but re-
versed the lower court's decision, finding that the VWIL program
remedied the constitutional violation.'9
1408 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F. 2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), aff/d, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996). The State Council of Higher Education and its members were dismissed
from the suit and Former Governor Wilder and the Commonwealth were granted
leave of any duty to appear on the condition that the Commonwealth would be
bound by the decision of the Court. Id. The VMI Foundation, the VMI Alumni Asso-
ciation and other private organizations intervened as defendants in the case over
the objection of the United States. Id.
'6 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996). When Virginia peti-
tioned for certiorari in VMI I in May, 1993, the Supreme Court refused to hear the
case, because it had been remanded to the District Court by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit had not yet decided the
case. United States v. Virginia, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993). When the Court granted
the United States petition for certiorari in VMI H, Virginia submitted a cross-
petition maintaining that VMrs admissions policy does not violate equal protection
guarantees. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
11 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, which included Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in concur-
rence, while Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Thomas recused himself from the case
because his son is a cadet at VMI. See id. at 2269; Robert Marquand, Male-Only
Military School Must Admit Female Cadets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27,
1996, at 1 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia).
18 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287. At trial, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia focused on the question of whether
VMs all-male admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. United States v. Virginia (VMI I), 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408
(W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
District Judge Jackson Kiser found VMIrs admissions policy to be substantially re-
lated to the state's legitimate interest in diversity of educational opportunities and
held the policy to be within constitutional parameters. Id. at 1413 ("I find that both
VMI's single-sex status and its distinctive educational method represent legitimate
contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher education system, and that exclud-
ing women is substantially related to this mission .... VMI ... met its burden under
Hogan .... "). Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that VMI failed to show "how
the maintenance of one single-gender institution gives effect to, or establishes the
existence of, the government objective advanced to support VMI's admissions policy,
a desire for educational diversity." United States v. Virginia (VMI I), 976 F.2d 890,
899 (4th Cir. 1992), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
'9 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996); see Marcia Coyle, High
Court Goes for "Skeptical" Scrutiny on Gender, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1996, at A12
(reporting on Supreme Coures decision in United States v. Virginia); Hope Viner
Samborn, Scrutiny Scrutinized, ABI J., Sept. 1996, at 29 (same).
While the Fourth Circuit found that the admissions policy of VM violated the
1996]
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that VMI
failed to show an "exceedingly pervasive justification" for exclud-
ing women from the Corp of Cadets, thus, the all-male admis-
sions policy violated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause."
Equal Protection Clause, the court suggested that VMI could retain their tradition
of a male-only Corp of Cadets if the Commonwealth offered a comparable military
program for women. United States v. Virginia (VMI I), 976 F.2d at 900 ("[T]he
Commonwealth might properly decide to admit women to VMI and adjust the pro-
gram to implement that choice, or it might establish parallel institutions or parallel
programs, or it might abandon state support of VMI, leaving VMI the option to pur-
sue its own policies as a private institution."), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The
Commonwealth responded by establishing the first state-run, all women's military
program, the Virginia Women's Leadership Institute on the campus of Mary Bald-
win College. See Soderberg, supra note 8, at 441-45 (comparing qualities of VMI
with its female counterpart VWIL); see also Juliette Kayyem, The Search for Citi-
zen-Soldiers: Female Cadets and the Campaign Against the Virginia Military Insti-
tute, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 259-61 (1995) (examining court decisions on
VWIL as remedy of constitutional violations). The United States challenged the va-
lidity of the VWIL as a proper remedy for VMI's constitutional violation, taking the
position that the only way a parallel program could remedy the equal protection
violations caused by VM's admissions policy was only if the program was, in all re-
spects, a mirror image of VMI. United States v. Virginia (VMI II), 852 F. Supp. 471,
473 (W.D. Va. 1994) (holding that proposed VWIL program served as adequate rem-
edy to constitutional violations in VMI I), affid, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); see Amstein, supra note 7, at 70-71 (reciting history of VMI
litigation before Judge Kiser's decision on VWIL program).
Differences between VMI and VWIL cited by the United States included: differ-
ences in academic degrees offered, differences in the qualification of faculty, differ-
ences in residential life requirements, and differences in the level of military train-
ing. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2284 (1996); see also Kayyem,
supra, at 260-61 (discussing view of district court concerning differences in aca-
demic offerings, residential life and military training pointed out by United States).
District Judge Kiser heard the case on remand and ruled in favor of the Com-
monwealth and VMI, finding that as long as the goal of producing "citizen-soldiers"
was the same for both institutions, the means of achieving the goal did not have to
be identical. Concluding, Judge Kiser wrote, "[i]f VMI marches to the beat of a
drum, then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is
over, both will have arrived at the same destination." United States v. Virginia
(VMI II), 852 F. Supp. at 484.
The United States appealed again to the Fourth Circuit, but this time the Court
of Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling, based in part on a special intermediate
scrutiny test:
the alternatives left available to each gender by a classification based on a
homogeneity of gender need not be the same, but they must be substan-
tively comparable so that ... we cannot conclude that the value of the
benefits provided ... to one gender tends, by comparison to the benefits
provided to the other, to lessen the dignity, respect, or sccietal regard of
the other gender.
United States v. Virginia (VMI II), 44 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996).
20 Justice Ginsburg flatly rejected both of the justifications offered in defense of
VMI's exclusion of women: 1) single-sex education contributes to diversity in educa-
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According to Justice Ginsburg, in order to meet the skeptical
scrutiny standard21 and its "exceedingly pervasive justification"
burden, a state must show "at least that the [gender based]
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.' ,,2
In examining the validity of the VWIL as an appropriate
remedy, Justice Ginsburg stated that "the Commonwealth has
created a VWIL program fairly appraised as a 'pale shadow' of
VMI in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stat-
tion; and 2) VMrs unique adversarial training would have to be modified if women
were admitted to the Corp of Cadets. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,
2282-84 (1996) ("Virginia, in sum, 'has fallen far short of establishing the
"'exceedingly persuasive justification" ... that must be the solid base for any gender-
defined classification.' "); Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 24-27, United States v. Vir-
ginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2264, (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available in 1995 WL 681099. But
see William A. DeVan, Note, Toward a New Standard in Gender Discrimination:
The Case of Virginia Military Institute, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 519 (1992)
(questioning "whether men and women are similarly situated with respect to ad-
missions to a military college").
21 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) ("Today's skeptical
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to
volumes of history."); see also Coyle, supra note 19, at A12 (arguing that Justice
Ginsburg's skeptical scrutiny standard represents heightened standard of review);
Samborn, supra note 19 (discussing mixed reaction and debate over relative
strength of skeptical scrutiny test).
22United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275. The court makes it clear that the
burden of justification rests entirely with the state and that justifications cannot be
based in whole or part "on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, ca-
pacities, or preferences of males and females." Id.
The Court takes much of the language of the "skeptical scrutiny" test from ear-
lier gender discrimination cases, many of which Justice Ginsburg argued before the
Court as an attorney. The "exceedingly persuasive justification" language originated
in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
Language placing the burden of justification entirely on the state can also be found
in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982), which
struck down a public nursing schoors all-female admissions policy as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated that "the
State has fallen far short of establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
needed to sustain the gender-based classification." Id. at 731. Furthermore, the in-
termediate scrutiny language ("important governmental objectives and that the dis-
criminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives") is derived from language in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(establishing and applying intermediate scrutiny test in striking down state law
setting legal drinking age at 18 for women and 21 for men). See also Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny
and citing to Craig v. Boren). But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (limiting case holding to MUW's policy of denying males admit-
tance to School of Nursing as violative of Equal Protection Clause).
1996]
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ure, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence."' The
Court, applying the skeptical scrutiny test, found that the only
viable solutions to remedy the constitutional violation were ei-
ther the admission of women into the Corp of Cadets or the con-
version of VMI into a private institution."
Writing in concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
the holding was justified because the Commomwealth and VMI
should have taken actions much sooner to conform with the
equal protection guarantees laid out in 19822" in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan.6 He did not, however, favor the
creation of a new test in the area of sex discrimination.27 Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that the "skeptical scrutiny test" is
even more complex and confusing than the original intermediate
scrutiny test.28
Justice Scalia served as the sole dissent in support of the
2 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2285 (1996). Additionally, the
Court noted that the Fourth Circuit "clearly erred" by granting judicial deference
and holding the VWIL proposal to a standard lower than the heightened scrutiny
standard applicable in all cases of gender discrimination. Id. at 2286. The Fourth
Circuit held that deferential analysis was appropriate because the case centered not
around discrimination against men or women specifically, but rather on "a classifi-
cation based on homogeneity of gender." United States v. Virginia (VMI II), 44 F.3d
1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
24 Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion for the Court, favored the admission of
women to VMI as the best solution to the crisis, but she did not preclude the alter-
native of transforming VMI into a private school. See United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996) ("There is no reason to believe that the admission of women
capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute
rather than enhance its capacity to serve the 'more perfect Union' ").
Id. at 2289. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court's decision in Mis-
sissippi University for Women v. Hogan should have placed VMI on notice that its
categorical exclusion of women might violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
2289. Had VMI moved sooner to remedy the constitutional violations, Chief Justice
Rehnquist might have decided differently. Id. at 2290.
26 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
27 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Given Chief Justice Rebnquist's historic views on gender discrimination and the in-
termediate scrutiny test, his support for the heightened scrutiny in relation to sex
discrimination cases was indeed surprising. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
239 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (continuing to voice objection to heightened
levels of scrutiny applied in gender discrimination cases); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (objecting specifically to Court's creation
of intermediate scrutiny test).
28 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 ("While terms like important
governmental objective' and 'substantially related' are hardly models of precision,
they have more content and specificity than does the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive
justification.' "); see also Samborn, supra note 19 (analyzing positions taken by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia).
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"history of our people" and the tradition of single-sex education.
Justice Scalia argued that despite the language borrowed from
the Court's prior decisions, Justice Ginsburg redefined the in-
termediate scrutiny standard so as to make it indistinguishable
from the strict scrutiny test." Justice Scalia further argued that
the majority created the skeptical scrutiny test because VMrs
admissions policy would not have violated the intermediate
scrutiny standard as applied in prior decisions.3 Justice Scalia
contended that the Court, in the process of ensuring that women
could attend VMI, has made it nearly impossible for government
to sponsor single-sex education on any level.32
This Comment examines whether Justice Ginsburg's opinion
for the Court established a new, stricter test for gender discrimi-
nation.33 It is submitted that Justice Ginsburg did not adopt the
strict scrutiny standard, but rather attempted to strengthen the
intermediate scrutiny test and move the Court closer toward the
eventual acceptance of strict scrutiny in gender discrimination.
Part I examines past gender discrimination decisions in search
2 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued that the decision handed down by the Court serves counter-
majoritarian principles and fundamentally changes our Constitution by interpreting
that it takes a side in the debate over single-sex education. Id. at 2291-92. Citing
recent developments in admissions policies of state-funded military colleges, such as
The Citadel in South Carolina, and federal military service academies, Justice
Scalia argued that the legislature, and not the courts, was the only proper forum to
change the traditional admissions policy of "an institution that has served the peo-
ple of the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century
and a half." Id. at 2291-93.
"' See id. at 2294 ("[T]he United States urged us to hold in this case that strict
scrutiny is the correct constitutional standard for evaluating classifications that
deny opportunities ... based on ... sex ... The Court, while making no reference to
the Government's argument, effectively accepts it.").
:" Thus, Justice Scalia maintained that the creation of a new test was the only
way for the Court to justify its decision. Id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[R]egardless of whether the Court's rationale leaves some small amount of room
for lawyers to argue, it ensures that single-sex public education is functionally
dead."); see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Closing Argument: A Threat to Single-Sex Edu-
cation, TEY LAW., Jan. 15, 1996, at 27, available in LEXIS, Legnws Library,
Curnws File (arguing U.S. position in VMI case was part of larger scheme to end
single-sex public education outside of affirmative action framework).
While there is much concern in the legal community about the impact of
United States v. Virginia on single-sex education in America, this comment focuses
upon gender discrimination law and does not address the separate issue of single-
sex education cases. Cases relating to single-sex education, therefore, will only be
discussed as they relate to the development of gender discrimination law and the
creation of the skeptical scrutiny standard.
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for a sound basis for a new skeptical scrutiny standard. Part II
analyzes the flaws in Justice Scalia's argument that skeptical
scrutiny is the equivalent of strict scrutiny. Finally, Part Ill
looks to the impact of United States v. Virginia on future gender
discrimination cases.
I. FROM RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO SKEPTICAL SCRUTINY
A. Extending Equal Protection Guarantees to Gender
Classifications
When the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution was ratified in 1868, it was not expected that the appli-
cation of the Equal Protection Clause would extend beyond the
bounds of racial discrimination.34 Discrimination based on sex
was not considered within the perview of equal protection scru-
tiny until 1971 when the Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,3" first
applied equal protection scrutiny to gender discrimination.36 The
Court analyzed equal protection guarantees in light of the strict
scrutiny and the less stringent rational relationship tests.
Originally, it chose to apply the rational relationship test to
classifications based on sex."1
The Supreme Court temporarily changed course during the
following term when, in the plurality opinion of Frontiero v.
" Furthermore, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment as initially pro-
posed used masculine language, granting protections for all men instead of all per-
sons. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1550
(1991) (discussing progress made in field of gender equity both in society at large
and court decisions); KAY & WEST, supra note 6, at 11 (noting disappointment of
early women's rights advocates with language of Fourteenth Amendment as pro-
posed).3" 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
38 Starting with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873), the Su-
preme Court limited application of the Equal Protection Clause to state laws that
discriminated against blacks. See O'Connor, supra note 34, at 1550 (discussing ex-
tension of equal protection guarantees to women).
The Supreme Court first extended the scope of the Equal Protection Clause to
include women in their 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which held
that states could not discriminate between men and women in choosing estate ad-
ministrators; see also RHODE, supra note 1, at 87 (citing Supreme Court's decision in
Reed as first case applying Equal Protection Clause to cases of gender discrimina-
tion).
17 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76; KAY & WEST, supra note 6, at 29-30 (discussing differ-
ences between rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests as applied in Reed).
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Richardson," Justice Brennan applied the strict scrutiny stan-
dard to a case where the husbands of service members were de-
nied dependency benefits given to wives. 9 While Justice Bren-
nan was never able to persuade a majority of the Court to hold
that gender was a suspect class, the Supreme Court eventually
created the intermediate scrutiny standard for cases involving
gender discrimination.4 °
B. The Supreme Court's Creation of Intermediate Scrutiny
Through Prior Decisions
In Craig v. Boren,4 the Court turned to the language of prior
decisions in support of its creation of the intermediate standard
of review.42 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, took issue
with the lack of precedent to support the "important government
interest" standard, and argued that the less demanding rational
relationship test was appropriate in gender discrimination
"' 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that benefits granted to spouses of soldiers must
be given without regard to gender).
"See id. at 690. The decision to extend strict scrutiny caused division among
Justices of the Court and changed Justice Brennan's opinion from a majority deci-
sion to a plurality opinion. Justice Powell, joined with Justice Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger in a concurring opinion, stated that the application of strict scrutiny
would be premature in light of the debate concerning the impending adoption of the
Equal Rights Amendment. These Justices did not wish to preempt a national politi-
cal decision with their own judicial pronouncements. Instead, the Justices believed
that the law was unconstitutional under both the rational relation test and Reed.
See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 301-03 (1979) (detailing process by which Justices ultimately decided Fron-
tiero and Brennan's decision to apply strict scrutiny); Amstein, supra note 7, at 82
(characterizing Frontiero as brief interlude between Court's application of rational
relationship test and creation of intermediate scrutiny standard). Justice Brennan's
decision in Frontiero may be considered the "high-water mark of gender discrimina-
tion Equal Protection Clause analysis." DeVan, supra note 20, at 504. Also of note,
Justice Ginsburg, before joining the Court, argued the case before the Court urging
a reversal of the law on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union. Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 678 (listing parties involved in suit).
40 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying new intermediate
scrutiny standards in striking down law establishing different drinking ages for men
and women). Justice Ginsburg, then representing the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, filed an amicus brief urging reversal of the District Court's decision upholding
the statute. Id. at 191 (listing all parties before Court). See also DeVan, supra note
19, at 505-06 (examining Court's decision in Craig v. Boren and establishment of in-
termediate scrutiny test).
41 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
42 Id. at 197-98 (creating intermediate scrutiny test without citing to precedent,
but stating that "previous cases establish" grounds for new intermediate scrutiny
standard).
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cases.43 Despite Justice Rehnquist's misgivings about intermedi-
ate scrutiny, the Court later applied the test to eliminate double
standards in applying for workers' compensation benefits,"
granting survivors' benefits,45 and assigning alimony payments.46
The intermediate scrutiny test remained in effect for twenty
years; its reign ended with the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Virginia.47
C. Strengthening Intermediate Scrutiny Through the Creation of
Skeptical Scrutiny
After re-examining several cases concerning equal protection
analysis,48 Justice Ginsburg chose to redefine the meaning of in-
termediate scrutiny and, in the process, replace it with a tougher
test.49 Justice Ginsburg did not cite specific cases to support the
change from the intermediate scrutiny test to the skeptical scru-
tiny language; however, Justice Ginsburg, using tactics similar
to those used by the Court in Craig v. Boren, adopted language
from landmark decisions in gender equity law.5"
43 Id. at 218-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting lack of authority cited by
Court to support new intermediate scrutiny standard). Justice Rehnquist stated,
"[t]he Court's conclusion that a law which treats males less favorably than females
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives' apparently comes out of thin air." Id. at 220
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4 Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
4' Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-12 (1977).
46 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
47 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996); see supra note 5 and accompanying text
(discussing history security of gender classification). It should be noted, however,
that Justice Ginsburg cited J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 458 U.S. 127 (1994), and
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 511 U.S. 718 (1982), as "pathmarking
decisions" that established the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard for
gender classifications. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
48 Justice Ginsburg began by noting that Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
marked the first time that the Court ruled in favor of a woman complaining of equal
protection violations. Justice Ginsburg then went on to cite Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455 (1981), Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), and additional case law
to establish the premise that post-Reed cases have demonstrated the Court's desire
to "carefully inspect [I... official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to
women (or to men)." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
" See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274-76 (1996) (reviewing gen-
der discrimination law creating skeptical scrutiny standard). Justice Ginsburg
stated that "the heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not
make sex a proscribed classification." Id. at 2276. The Justice, however, then noted
"such classifications may not be used as they once were ... to create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women." Id. (citations omitted).
50 Neither Justice Ginsburg in the VMI case nor Justice Brennan in Craig v.
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Justice Ginsburg's move to skeptical scrutiny was not sud-
den or unexpected." The Court noted in J.E.B. v. Alabama52 that
the issue of whether classifications based on gender were inher-
ently suspect remained an open question.53 In Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women v. Hogan,' the Supreme Court discussed the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" burden as one which is
only met by proving the intermediate scrutiny standard.5
It was this exceedingly persuasive justification language
which is the heart of Justice Ginsburg's skeptical scrutiny test.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the "important governmental
interest,"58 skeptical scrutiny focuses primarily on the exceed-
Boren had a direct precedential mandate for adopting a new equal protection test.
Given the breadth of case law decided between 1976 and 1996, however, Justice
Ginsburg was able to use Court doctrine to formulate the skeptical scrutiny test.
Compare United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274-76 (1996), with Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
"' Justice Ginsburg devoted much of her legal career to gender equity issues,
primarily as an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, arguing before the
courts or submitting amicus curie briefs in most of the landmark sex discrimination
cases. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (same); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Ginsburg
submitted amicus brief); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972).
52 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
' Id. at 137 n.6 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 26 (1993) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring)). It was standard practice for the Court to examine a sex discrimina-
tion suit under the intermediate scrutiny test. Upon finding that the classifications
clearly failed even the intermediate scrutiny test, There was no need for the Court
to determine whether gender is an inherently suspect classification. See, e.g., Mis-
sissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982) (stating that since
MUW's all-female admissions policy clearly failed intermediate scrutiny evaluation
there was no need to decide if gender classifications were inherently suspect); Stan-
ton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether gen-
der was inherently suspect classification, thus leaving open question for later de-
termination).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
'3Id. at 724. The "exceedingly persuasive justification" language actually origi-
nated in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney when the Court stated
that public employment precedent would "require an exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation to withstand a constitutional challenge." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 273 (1978). The Courts decision in Mississippi University for Women
symbolizes a mid-point in the development of intermediate scrutiny language be-
cause Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court begins focusing on language other
that "important governmental interest" in general gender discrimination cases, thus
opening the door for Justice Ginsburg's decision in United States v. Virginia.
' The traditional intermediate scrutiny language says that the classification
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see John
Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508 (1993)
(remarking on establishment of confusing intermediate scrutiny standard in Craig
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ingly persuasive justification burden and uses intermediate
scrutiny language as a starting point in proving the classifica-
tion's justification. 7 Skeptical scrutiny then strengthens the old
standard by placing the entire burden of this "demanding" justi-
fication on the state.58 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, courts
must apply this standard not only when evaluating the law or
policy facing scrutiny, but also to the proposed remedy.59
While United States v. Virginia may have signaled the end
of the intermediate scrutiny doctrine, the Court continued to ban
the use of stereotypes in proving constitutionality. The Court
first gave notice that parties could not rely on stereotypes in sex
discrimination cases in Stanton v. Stanton, when the Court
struck down a law based on stereotypes of the role of women in
the home.6° The Court strengthened and extended its position in
v. Boren).
"' See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275-76 (1996) (listing re-
quirements for meeting strict scrutiny test). Justice Ginsburg first focused on the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" citing "pathmark" decisions J.E.B. v. Alabama
and Mississippi University for Women. Id. at 2274. She then required proof of an
"important governmental interest" pursuant to the Court's decisions in Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), as
a means for meeting this tougher burden. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at
2277.
58 While it appears that placing the entire burden on the state was not a revo-
lutionary concept in equal protection cases, the decision by the Fourth Circuit cre-
ated a new, lower-level test to be applied with respect to the remedial portion of a
gender-based Equal Protection Clause case. See United States v. Virginia (VMI II),
44 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995) (creating "special intermediate scrutiny" stan-
dard which was applied analyzing validity of VWIL remedy), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996). The creation of the "special intermediate scrutiny" standard by the lower
court forced the Supreme Court to clarify which level of scrutiny must be imposed
during the remedial stage of equal protection litigation. United States v. Virginia,
116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996). Ginsburg asserted that the Fourth Circuit "plainly
erred in exposing Virginia's VWIL plan to a deferential analysis," which was based
upon "a brand of review inconsistent with the more exacting standard our ... prece-
dent requires." Id.
" See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2286 (finding Fourth Circuit erred
in granting any type of deference to VMI and Commonwealth of Virginia when
evaluating validity of VWIL as constitutional remedy).
60 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975) (holding that statute which
provided that females reach age of majority at 18 and that males reach age of major-
ity at 21 could not survive equal protection analysis); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114
S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (noting that classifications cannot be based on archaic and
overbroad generalizations about gender or outdated misconceptions concerning role
of women in home or work); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985) (remarking that statutes often reflect misconceptions concerning women's
roles); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (noting that "old notions" of role
typing were not valid governmental classifications).
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this area when in Mississippi University for Women it stated,
"the test ... must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects ar-
chaic and stereotypic notions." 1 Justice Ginsburg, again reem-
phasized the Court's stance by holding that the justification
must be genuine, rather than created in response to litigation,
and cannot "rely on overbroad generalizations" about the differ-
ences between men and women.62 The end product is a test
which is grounded in existing precedent, but which strengthens
the level of equal protection guarantees for women, and further
emphasizes the ban on the use of stereotypes to defend sexist
classifications.
II. DISSENTING FROM JUSTICE ScALIA's DISSENT
A. Why Not Strict Scrutiny Now?
Justice Scalia focused the weight of his dissent on arguing
against what he perceived to be Justice Ginsburg's adoption of
the strict scrutiny test. 3 One of the facts relied upon by Justice
Scalia was the posture taken by the United States in its brief
supporting the extension of strict scrutiny review to cases involv-
ing sex discrimination.' Specifically, the United States argued
6' Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982). Again, if
one views the Mississippi University for Women decision as the mid-point in the in-
termediate scrutiny doctrine, it is important to note that Justice O'Connor treated
the use of stereotypes to prove the validity of gender-based classifications as just
another requirement on the intermediate scrutiny list. Id.
62 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996); see also Coyle, supra
note 19, at A12 (reciting skeptical scrutiny test set forth by Justice Ginsburg).
' See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2293-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(analyzing flaws in Court's decision and reasoning, with emphasis on creation of
skeptical scrutiny test).
See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brief for the Petitioner at *33-36,
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1041), available in 1995
WL 703403; Brief for the Cross-Respondent at *16, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-2107), available in 1995 WL 745010.
The United States was not alone in requesting this approach, as amicus briefs
also argued in favor of extending strict scrutiny protections in gender discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center, American Civil
Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner at *2-3, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941), available in 1995 WL 703392; Brief of the Employ-
ment Center, et al. in Support of Petitioner at *21-24, United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), available in 1995 WL 702836.
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that "[s]pecial judicial vigilance [was] required to prevent sex
from serving as a convenient, but harmful and constraining,
proxy for actual abilities and needs." 5 It is clear, however, that
the United States did not rely solely on their strict scrutiny
stance when arguing before the Court. In fact, the United States
made it clear that while their ultimate goal was the adoption of
the strict scrutiny standard, their case sub judice was equally
persuasive under the existing intermediate scrutiny frame-
work.66
Even if the United States had insisted on strict scrutiny, it
was clear from the transcript of the oral argument that a major-
ity of the Court would have been unwilling to take that step in
the VMI case.67 Legal analysts and "Supreme Court watchers"
observed a reluctance among some members of the Court to ac-
cept the government's position and adopt the strict scrutiny
standard.68 Justice Ginsburg made it clear in her opinion for the
Court that strict scrutiny was not adopted in the VMI case.66 It
is clear to legal analysts that Justice Ginsburg could not risk
making strict scrutiny the issue because such a drastic step
would not have received majority support," thus, any move to
accept strict scrutiny would have jeopardized the outcome of the
VMI case itself.
6 Brief for the Petitioner at *35, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996) (No. 94-1941), available in 1995 WL 703403.
" See id. at *36 ("[We show in the balance of this brief, that VMI's policy of ex-
cluding women cannot stand under the 'intermediate' scrutiny applied by this Court
in its prior cases."); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at *12 (United
States responding "yes" to question of whether case could be decided on basis of in-
termediate scrutiny); Brief for the Cross-Respondent at *16-17, United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-2107), available in 1995 WL 745010.
6' See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at *12-14 (questioning of Paul
Bender, Deputy Solicitor General for the United States, by Justices concerning ap-
propriate standard for gender discrimination cases and evincing hostile stance to-
ward United States' suggestion that strict scrutiny is potentially appropriate stan-
dard).
" See Coyle, supra note 19, at A12 ("During oral argument ..., it seemed clear
the justices were not prepared to replace the intermediate standard with strict
scrutiny .... ).
69 "The Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifi-
cation based on race or national origin .... " United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264, 2275-76 n.6 (1996).
70 See supra note 67; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Decisions Expand Equal
Protection Rights, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at C7 (questioning tactical decision by
federal government to argue for strict scrutiny in VMI case).
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B. Skeptical Scrutiny is not Strict Scrutiny
Justice Scalia focuses most of his attention on opposing Jus-
tice Ginsburg's de facto adoption of the strict scrutiny test for sex
discrimination cases.7 It appears that Justice Scalia's worries
are, at least for the moment, misplaced. Although skeptical
scrutiny does significantly strengthen the ability of women's
groups to challenge state actions as violative of equal protection
guarantees, this new test does not equal the strict scrutiny re-
view employed in cases of racial discrimination.72 The skeptical
scrutiny test neither purports to reach the level of scrutiny ap-
plied by the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson,73 nor borrows any
of the language used repeatedly by the Court when applying
strict scrutiny.74
The easiest way to uncover the differences between strict
scrutiny and skeptical scrutiny is through an examination of the
language of both tests. Skeptical scrutiny, like strict scrutiny,
places a heavy burden on the state to prove constitutionality in-
stead of forcing others to prove a constitutional violation.7' Out-
side of the burden placed by these two standards, however, the
tests are noticeably different. The acceptance of strict scrutiny
would imply that all Justices signing onto a Court's opinion had
accepted gender as an inherently suspect classification. In this
regard, it is important to remember that the Court has never
" See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(argVng that Court essentially accepted United States' argument).
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(explaining strict scrutiny test and its application in racial discrimination cases); see
also infra note 76 (noting Justice Ginsburg's concession that skeptical scrutiny
standard applied in present case is not same standard as in racial discrimination
cases).
73 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (invoking strict scrutiny analysis to female plaintiff's equal protection
claim); cf infra note 81 (noting that Court never followed and ultimately abandoned
Frontiero).
74 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (extending strict scrutiny to gender discrimi-
nation cases); DeVan, supra note 19, at 502-04 (analyzing strict scrutiny standard
as applied in Frontiero decision).
7, Compare United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) ("The burden
of justification is demanding and rests entirely on the State."), with DONALD E.
LivELY, THE CONsTrTUTION AND RACE 139 (1992) ("Such exacting [strict scrutiny]
review, characterizing analysis of classifications, tends to be unforgiving."); GI-
RARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE CoURT 31 (1993) (explaining that race is
suspect classification because of "relative political powerlessness of racial minori-
ties" requires close judicial monitoring).
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firmly held that gender is an inherently suspect classification.76
Most importantly, in defining the parameters of the strict
scrutiny test, the Court refers to the "compelling state interest"
which must be proven." On its face, it appears that proving a
state interest "compelling" is more difficult than proving that a
governmental objective is "important," which is the basic re-
quirement needed to probe that the justification is "exceedingly
persuasive."78 The language of the two standards makes clear
that no matter how tough the skeptical scrutiny standard may
be to prove, it is certainly an easier burden than strict scrutiny.
Therefore, it is asserted that Justice Scalia had little reason to
worry about de facto recognition of strict scrutiny by the Court in
the VMI case.
III. CAN STRICT SCRUTINY SUCCEED FOLLOWING UNITED STATES
V. VIRGINIA?
Although the aforementioned fears of Justice Scalia regard-
ing the Court's analysis in United States v. Virginia are un-
founded, opponents of the strict scrutiny standard have reasons
to be concerned." By creating a skeptical scrutiny standard and
moving more slowly in the direction of strict scrutiny, Justice
Ginsburg has helped prevent another Frontiero decision form oc-
curring.0 Justice Ginsburg's skeptical scrutiny test helps to
7' United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 (identifying that Court's skeptical
scrutiny standard does not make gender proscribed classification); see also NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 778.
7 See SPANN, supra note 75, at 31 (explaining that strict scrutiny requires proof
of compelling governmental interest).
71 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (stating that state
must show classification serves important governmental interest and "the means
employed are 'substantially related' to the achievement of those objectives in order
to be 'exceedingly persuasive' "); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982) (noting that proof of "important governmental interests" is require-
ment in proving "exceedingly persuasive justification").79 Given the current trend in favor of single-sex education, critics argue that the
VMI case will leave lasting damage in single-sex public schools. See Soderberg, su-
pra note 8, at 460 (arguing that VMI case threatens legal status of private women's
colleges); Taylor, supra note 32, at 27 (speculating about impact of United States v.
Virginia on state-supported single-sex education both at and below college level).
But see Brief of Twenty-Six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107),
available in 1995 WL 702837 (arguing that reversal of VMI 11 would not undermine
or threaten maintenance of private single-sex educational institutions).
80 The Court's decision as articulated in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
Frontiero v. Richardson held that strict scrutiny was the proper test in gender dis-
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promote the eventual adoption of strict scrutiny by giving other
Justices time to adjust to tougher standards in sex discrimina-
tion cases, while reminding legal practitioners and scholars that
the issue of strict scrutiny in these cases is not dead.
It is important to consider the political leanings of Court
members when evaluating the viability of strict scrutiny as the
test of the future, as it takes a majority of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court to adopt any concept."1 The creation of skeptical
scrutiny edges the Court closer to strict scrutiny without equat-
ing gender classifications to race classifications. The new test
allows the Court to be tougher on states continuing to discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender, while avoiding an undoubtedly con-
troversial "strict scrutiny" label. 2 This will help lawyers in the
future to push the Court toward a final adoption of the strict
scrutiny standard since all ideas embodied in this toughest equal
protection test will already have been accepted in some form by a
majority of Court members.
Footnotes never decide cases, but they often contain hidden
clues about future leanings of the Court in areas of the law.83
This truism is confirmed in Justice Ginsburg's decision. While
footnote six helps disprove Justice Scalia's theory that the Court
adopted strict scrutiny in the VMI case, the language of the foot-
note also shows that Justice Scalia does have cause for concern.'
By reminding "court watchers" that the issue of strict scrutiny is
not dead, the Court invites the legal community to continue to
crimination cases. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., plural-
ity opinion). The Court never consistently followed that strict scrutiny language of
Frontiero and by 1976 the Court completely abandoned the ruling in favor of inter-
mediate scrutiny. See DeVan, supra note 20, at 505-06; see also supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
81 See generally WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 39, at 300-02 (noting
importance of both external national politics and internal court politics on Frontiero
decision).
8 See discussion supra Part I-C (arguing skeptical scrutiny is stronger standard
than intermediate scrutiny). In this connection, it should be noted that courts are
reluctant to apply heightened standards of review to new classes. See Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (stating that Court has in past declined to
use heightened standards to review treatment based upon age).
83 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, at 386 (analyzing importance of footnote
four in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
84 The text of footnote six of Justice Ginsburg's decision states, "[t]he court has
thus far reserved most stringent scrutiny for classifications based on race or na-
tional origin ... ." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 n.6 (1996). As Ju-
dith Lichtman of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, told the National Law Journal,
"[w]hy put in two words that mean nothing?" Coyle, supra note 19, at A12.
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push for its adoption in future cases and insures that gender
equality and sex discrimination will not be placed on the Court's
back burner.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v.' Virginia
symbolizes the rejuvenation of heightened equal protection guar-
antees for both men and women. Through the adoption of the
skeptical scrutiny standard the Court placed all public actors on
notice that gender discrimination will not be tolerated. The
Court did not set out to destroy the institution of single-sex edu-
cation, or to threaten the hundreds of private, single-sex colleges
that provide exceptional educational opportunities to men and
women throughout the country. Justice Ginsburg's decision fo-
cused on those few institutions, including VMI, that held them-
selves out as offering unique educational experiences, while ex-
cluding one sex on the basis of archaic gender stereotypes.
The VMI decision did more than provide a few exceptional
women the opportunity to attend one of the most prestigious
military colleges in the country; it re-enforced the ideal that
those who work hard and strive for their goals may achieve them
regardless of their gender.
Christina Gleason
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